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Insofar as we are rational creatures, minimally good practical reasons exert a force 
on our actions. But what is it about the nature of inference that makes practical 
reasons normatively forceful? There are three attempted answers. First, the force 
of practical reasons might be derived from their instrumental role -- on this 
explanation, the presumed acceptability of the end transmits its rational propriety 
to the choice of appropriate means. Second, it might issue from their substantive 
role just in case the ends themselves are open to critical self-diagnosis, i.e., where 
the rationality of ends themselves is derived from their ability to satisfy a 
universally valid rule. Third, it might derive from their phenomenological role, 
i.e., ends and means are both evaluable in terms of their qualitative fit with respect 
to the contents of judgment. The instrumental account is the most influential by 
far, and usually associated with Hume; the substantive account is influential in 
ethics and value theory, associated with Kant.i Yet neither account explains 
intuitively manifest failures of practical reason mereologically: i.e., by saying that 
the contents of the judgment entertained do not fit properly with the judgment 
considered as a whole, and especially, in connection with the way that the knower 
is oriented towards the contents of the thought.  
Consider: suppose I say, “My expectation that Smith will win the election is 
true.” This is a grammatically bizarre thing to say; for expectations are not 
generally true, so much as apt or inapt, and the grammatical infelicity is of a kind 
that reflects a failure to adopt the right orientation towards the nested proposition. 
Notwithstanding the strangeness, though, the sentence is meaningful – if we say 
it is nonsense, the challenge will have to involve a sharp derogative use of that 
term which has long fallen from favor. If we wanted to say that I misused my 
words, the question is why this instance counts as a misuse; and if one wanted to 
say that this is the wrong choice of propositional attitudes, the question is what 
makes a choice of attitudes wrong. You might want to say it is because the attitude 
of expectation is the wrong means to the end, which is the representation of a state 
where Smith wins the election; but this seems to be imposing an artificial 
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separation between relata, since the judgment at issue is not the nested proposition 
(whatever is to the right of the ‘that’-clause) and the attitude that it connects to, so 
much as our reflective disfavor of the way that the clause and attitude fit together 
given that the whole proposition of which they are parts is not (in my view) 
nonsense. We need an account of the ill fit between the attitude parts and their 
whole, not the relation between means and ends, or between maxims and the 
categorical imperative. That ill fit is grasped by thinking about the ways we are 
going about thinking of things, i.e., this thought as a proposition-attitude pairing, 
and how that pairing is intuitively bizarre for reasons, not just because of a 
credulity towards grammar. 
Such failures are cases of irrational intentionality, and the most interesting (I 
call them ‘radical’) occasions of irrational intentionality are those where a 
judgment is subverted owing to a misalignment between the contents of a 
judgment and the way the knower is oriented towards those contents. I shall argue 
that the phenomenological account can explain what is promising about 
substantive accounts, and that it is capable of doing so without needing to trace its 
success back to its tacit or explicit instrumental role. 
The phrase ‘irrational intentionality’ does not occur very often in analytic 
philosophy – or elsewhere. Certainly, a seasoned philosopher might even be 
surprised to find out that there is any such thing as irrational intentionality. Yet 
one aim of this paper is to argue that many well-known failures of practical 
rationality do, at least sometimes, fall under the banner of irrational intentionality. 
After some methodological and conceptual remarks in §1-2, I consider four 
potential examples of irrational intentionality: irrational conations (e.g., conations 
that subvert ends in action) and irrational positions (e.g., positionally constitutive 
ignorance towards facts) in §3, irrational concepts (a Gestalt orientation towards 
disjunctive categorizations) in §4, and irrational attention (e.g., delirious paranoia 
towards objects) in §3-4. I suggest the failures of reason that typify these kinds of 
cases issue from the fact that they are radical cases of irrational intentionality. 
None of them need to be explained as failures of instrumental reasoning in order 
to understand what has gone wrong with them. The problem is that each of these 
phenomena can be understood as a mental state that is intrinsically out of order. 
An account of irrational intentionality has four features: it is the study of a 
certain kind of failed reasoning, involves errors that are ostensibly avoidable, with 
relatively simple constituent reasons and judgments, and whose failure suggests 
reference to cognitive mechanisms that are introspectively identifiable. 1. The 
error of reasoning can be identified as a subversion of the strict supporting 
relationship between judgment and its supporting reasons (premise-conclusions 
relation), i.e., where the attributed rational fault makes a decisive difference to the 
degree to which the conclusion is worthy of assent. 2. We are only interested in 
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those cases where there is a hope of being able to judge otherwise, i.e., where mis-
orientations to objects of judgment are not ‘built-in’ by our native cognitive 
architecture. 3. The study needs to focus on relatively simple judgments, since the 
more we appeal to higher-order reasons (e.g., volitional necessities), the more we 
are at risk of smuggling means-ends reasoning into judgment. 4. Intentionality 
obeys the need for coherence, so is grounded in the recognition and/or integration 
of patterns, which is the very thing that irrational intentionality distorts. 
Throughout, I shall be concerned to guard against three major counter-
arguments from an instrumentalist. An instrumentalist could object that practical 
reasons are belief-desire pairs, and therefore must be means-ends pairings (§2); 
that positions, being higher-order beliefs, are sufficiently complex as to count as 
instrumental reasons (§2); and that any study of inferential consequences of a 
concept involves tacit means-ends reasoning, as illustrated in our capacity to 
distinguish between benign and malevolent disjunctive categorizations (§3). I 
reply that the belief-desire vocabulary represents only a small and 
unrepresentative sample of folk psychological states, and that a more perspicuous 
accounting must take low-contrast attitudes seriously; that, while higher-order 
states can be reasonably suspected of being derived from tacit instrumental 
reasoning, this is not a decisive point one might make against merely second-
order ones; and that the difference between benign and malevolent disjunctive 
categorizations can be found in the failure of antecedent conditions of application 







We possess rationality insofar as our judgments are appropriately supported by 
our reasons for judgment, whether ‘judgment’ is propositional or imperative. 
There are at least two ways of explaining that supporting relationship.ii On the 
instrumentalist conception, an actor behaves rationally only insofar as they 
arrive at an appropriate choice of means in light of some predetermined ends.iii 
The ends are presupposed, the only suitable question is whether an agent has 
voluntarily chosen the right means to that end after deliberation. The 
substantivist conception of rationality proposes that it is possible for ends 
themselves to be (ir)rational, extending the field of inquiry into a discussion of 
whether our ultimate values are appropriate measures of some domain of rational 
action or thought.iv The suitability of such intrinsically valuable ends-in-
themselves (e.g., the good will for Kant) are judged in terms of rational diagnostic 
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tests (e.g., the categorical imperative), and determine corresponding judgments 
of irrationality (e.g., the willful subordination of right principles to mere 
expediency). The instrumentalist conception is concerned with the development 
and deployment of the whole gamut of experience to effectively secure one’s 
goals, typically in a way that minimizes losses and maximizes. The substantivist 
conception widens the field to consider whether the ends themselves are rational 
to hold by their own lights, and central to theories of justice. Yet it is also possible 
to demarcate a third conception of irrationality, the phenomenological theory, 
which treats some passage of thought as irrational simply by virtue of being held 
in the ways they are and being what they are about.v This conception widens the 
field further still by answering the same questions as the first and second theories, 
while also taking material inferences (i.e., negative rational intuitions, manifest 
sense of error) at face value.vi 
On first glance, the instrumental conception is able to make sense of the 
insights of the substantive account by arguing that the (ir)rationality of a 
judgment about an end-in-itself is only meaningful by covert means-ends 
reasoning, e.g., by reference to higher-order ends held in the background. (So, 
e.g., justice seems like it is intrinsically valuable only because a whole lot of our 
practical beliefs happen to be concerned with justice.) The converse argument is 
also possible, as a champion of the substantive conception of rationality can argue 
that the evaluation of the means-ends relationship is itself unintelligible without 
an intuitive sense of what makes for good inferences, period. The substantivist 
might add that their account of rationality has the advantage of transparency, 
since if an explicit end is bad then the irrationality of the means can be 
immediately inferred. Their account also sates the appetite for foundational self-
justifying norms like the categorical imperative. A standoff between 
instrumentalist and substantivist interpretations of rationality can be maintained 
because both accounts trade on a common vernacular, the practical language of 
means and ends. The third conception agrees that the instrumentalist and 
substantivist conceptions describe some proper instances of (ir)rationality, but 
also admits of a class of cases that instrumentalism rejects -- namely, those where 
the terms of a judgment can be irrational simply by virtue of one’s orientation 
towards them. For the intentionalist, ‘means-ends’ reasoning sometimes mis-
describes the nature of the connection between judgment and its supporting 
reasons, owing to the failure of the contents to fit the reasoner’s point of view. 
In what follows I provisionally explore some of the central cases of this third 
conception of rationality: paradoxes, akrasia, critical paranoia, unstructured 
patterns, disjunctive categorizations, and constitutive ignorance. The method is 
phenomenological, in that I suspend belief in instrumental rationality for the sake 
of understanding intentional rationality. My purpose is not to endorse the 
 
 
 IRRATIONAL INTENTIONALITY 5 
intentionalist view, or even to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
intentionalist view, but only to encourage systematic attention to its nature, scope, 
and philosophical consequences.  
The phenomenological method requires that we should bracket away certain 
sorts of considerations for the sake of analysis. For our purposes, I shall ask the 
reader to suspend belief in any opinions they might have about what counts as a 
sufficient reason to believe that a conclusion is satisfactorily grounded in its 
premises, insofar as these judgments of sufficiency overtly demand means-ends 
reasoning. This will entail suspending belief in the propriety of certain forms of 
inference -- e.g., it is almost certainly true that cost-benefit analysis and inference 
to the best explanation will typically make overt use of means-ends rationality, 
and almost certainly false that deductive or material inference do. So, in cases of 
abductive reasoning, ask: ‘can this passage of judgment be captured by deductive 
or material inference?’ If it cannot, then set the inference aside as unfit as a 
candidate of irrational intentionality. Once bound by these strictures we might be 





There is a special kinship between the idea that irrational ends-in-themselves and 
that some judgments are irrational to hold by virtue of the ways we are orientated 
towards what they are about, as the former seem to be a special instance of the 
latter. If an end itself is irrational, then any attempt to hold a judgment which 
describes the proper means of achieving that end shall also be irrational, just by 
virtue of what the judgment is about. It is an ‘end-in-itself’ just in case it conforms 
to a kind of judgment which is always -- perhaps even necessarily -- rational to 
uphold and enforce. Kant’s articulation of the categorical imperative is one such 
judgment, as his three formulations of the categorical imperative issue from his 
conceptual scheme that is ostensibly embedded in our position as rational 
creatures (i.e., the Categories of Quantity).vii For instance, his formula of humanity 
is oriented towards the plurality of objects and ends, meaning the “matter or 
content” of a judgment. So, taking Kant at his word, violations of the formula of 
humanity are recognisable as cases where a judgment that fails as rational just by 
virtue of being held and being what it is about. 
The notion of irrational intentionality comes from a different place than the 
substantivist account of irrationality, and has different sorts of downstream 
consequences. It arises from considerations related to the interplay of logic and 
mind, the traditional areas of concern in discussions of theoretical rationality -- 
whatever influence it has on making sense of the rationality of intrinsic value is 
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inferred from it and not assumed beforehand. Its central assumption is that we 
can examine the rationality of judgments in the tribunal of experience by 
bracketing away (or temporarily suspending belief in) any of those inferences in 
a web of belief that do not make a manifest difference to the diagnosis of the 
rationality of a judgment in its context. Its primary domain of application is the 
psychology of mental representation and its behavioral and agentic effects, and 
only indirectly on ethical theory. Meanwhile, if we discover that something is 
substantively irrational, then we will have come to understand something about 
living a strict moral life. If on the other hand we find ourselves looking at some 
representations as irrational in themselves, our conclusions may or may not have 
much to do with ends unworthy of pursuit or endorsement, though you can be 
sure that a strictly moral life will be precluded by irrational intentionality. 
An agent displays irrational intentionality insofar as their judgment is 
defective by virtue of the ways that the agent who holds the judgment is oriented 
towards what their judgment is about. In a shallow sense, this always already 
applies to both judgments of improper means to ends and judgments of improper 
ends themselves, since both are presumably 'about' the wrong sorts of things in 
the wrong sorts of ways. One might then think that instrumental rationality is just 
a special case of phenomenological rationality, potentially risking psychologism. 
Though an argument of that sort is possible, I will not assert anything quite so 
immodest in this essay, nor do I see much promise in following that line of 
thought -- what follows is meant to be an exploration of the phenomenological 
view, not a reduction or elimination of the instrumentalist one. 
It is sensible to observe a subclass of cases of irrational intentionality that are 
appreciably irrational from both the intentionalist and instrumentalist points of 
view, a place of overlap. For example, suppose I am playing a game of softball, 
out in the field, and I believe the team at bat is unlikely to make any hits. So, out 
of boredom, I allow my attention to wander, and I become fixed on watching a 
cat in the bleachers. But, due to my inattention, I miss out on a pop fly, which 
lands by my feet; and as a result, my team loses the game. My distracted attention 
was an instance irrational intentionality since the cat was not the rationally 
appropriate thing to attend to in the rich context of my plans. And yet, my 
misdirected attention was rationally defective because it was an impediment to 
my broader ends. Or, for another example: suppose that an editorial board of a 
magazine decides not to publish a controversial article because they worry that 
attention to the article would inflame further controversy. Given their ends (avoid 
controversy), the choice of means (deciding to publish) would instrumentally 
irrational; yet it can only be appreciated as irrational once one accepts that a 
controversial subject is made controversial in part by paying attention to it. Call 
all of those cases which are equally amenable to description in terms of 
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intentionalist and instrumentalist conceptions of rationality 'moderate cases'. 
Although moderate cases are not the focus of this essay, they should give a sense 
of the general scope of the intentionalist view. 
Though there is overlap between instrumental and intentionalist views, it 
would be a mistake to think of irrational intentionality as a trivial neologism. For 
the category also includes, but is not exhausted by, a special subclass of 
judgments that seem rationally defective by virtue of their defective constituents 
and the ways they are coordinated, and not by their broader instrumental role. 
Call these ‘radical cases’. This set includes, but is not exhausted by, those 
occasions where a claim is irrational by virtue of its terms (i.e., subject or 
predicate). Practical judgments that propose to contradict ends-in-themselves, or 
irrational ends, are one kind of radical case. So, e.g., “The best way to cause the 
most misery in the world is to create a nuclear holocaust” is an irrational judgment 
by virtue of the fact that the proposed end is substantially irrational -- the very 
idea that there is a ‘best’ way to cause mass misery is simply denied. 
To see the scope of radical cases, let’s consider a very different kind of 
example. Namely, cases of irrational belief, understood as mono-sentential 
paradoxes like “This sentence is false”. It can hardly be disputed that this 
semantic paradox is irrational owing to its self-defeating characteristics, 
especially insofar as we are oriented towards the judgment as a potential belief. 
Indeed, since the paradox concerns a single sentence, the diagnosis is 
immediately available to attention. To hold that isolated judgment in mind as a 
suitable candidate for belief is already to have engaged in a mistake -- the merest 
attention to that judgment reveals that it is impossible to rationally believe, 
because its valence is apparently incapable of staying put under scrutiny. Yet the 
nature of that mistake is not easy to diagnose in a fashion that would advantage 
the substantivist account. For there is no distinctive sense in which the semantic 
paradox fails because it involves an explicitly irrational goal. For one thing, of 
course, it is not clear that all theoretical judgments can be properly phrased in 
terms of the logic of means and ends. For another thing, the central 
preoccupations of substantial accounts are in theories of justice, not logic. But 
putting those matters aside, it is still the case that the presumed end of every 
indicative sentence -- truth -- is left tacit. As a result, one of the main advantages 
of the substantivist theory, transparency, is not available. Nor is it a distinctive 
case of a failure of instrumental rationality, since unlike poly-sentential 
paradoxes, the judgment’s failure is distinctively self-defeating. Ostensibly, the 
rational defect relates to the way it is held and about it is about, which is apparent 
regardless of any further opinions we might have. 
The tripartite relationship between the theories can be observed in Fig. 1, 
below. ‘R’ stands for the conceptual space that includes radical cases, ‘M’ stands 
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for the space that includes ‘moderate cases’. ‘X’ means a vacant conceptual space 
– I suggest, as a secondary or motivating concern of the essay, that substantial 
rationality is most distinctive when conceived a radical instance of intentional 
rationality, and obscure otherwise. A question mark is placed in those 









While there are some advantages in appealing to a rich conception of goodness 
in the evaluation of inferential propriety, the account sometimes seems guilty of 
over-explanation of the obvious. If a student asserts the semantic paradox in the 
course of discussion section, or an oxymoron or manifest absurdity like "Rain 
isn't wet", their instructor need not challenge them in ideological fashion by 
proposing an overall worldview where the student has failed to participate in the 
good life. On some occasions, the instructor needs only to propose a challenge in 
order to see the assertion withdrawn. And while this can sometimes be done in an 
illegitimate or epistemically unjust way (as in Lewis's "incredulous stare"), the 
withdrawal is sometimes sufficient and justified by the student's own lights, e.g., 
insofar as they cannot appeal either to intuitions that conform to good-faith 
interpretations of their biography, or to beliefs justified by evidence and informed 
by theory. 
Those modern-day value theorists who endorse substantive conceptions of 
rationality (e.g., Rawls, Nozick) have nothing to lose by expanding their attention 
to radical cases of irrational intentionality. For one thing, latter-day conversations 
over what qualifies as an end-in-itself, and what test to use in diagnosing it, may 
already seem to have a groundless or 'skyhook' quality to them. One could attempt 
to ground one's conception of an end-in-itself in terms of the web of belief or 
wide reflective equilibrium, potentially resulting in accusations that they are 
engaged in disguised means-ends reasoning. In so doing, though, the substantive 
theorist would lose precious ground to the instrumentalist one. For another thing, 
the special focus on ends that belongs to the substantive theorist can be explained 
by their preoccupation with particular sorts of philosophical questions and 
problems, namely those related to theories of justice. If a conception of rationality 
can address a wider range of theoretical questions, while also accommodating the 
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While mono-sentential paradoxes (irrational beliefs) and false claims about 
intrinsic ends (irrational ends) are part of the class of radical cases, they do not 
constitute the whole. Discussion will address four other sorts of cases: irrational 
choices, irrational positions, irrational categorisations, and irrational attention 
in ‘rolling commentary’ style. Conceptual tools necessary for the analysis will be 
presented during the course of their use in examining the cases. And though every 
case under discussion is exotic, most should also be familiar; there is by now a 
rich literature that examines irrational choices (akrasia), conations (aliefs and 
phobias), and concepts (Borgesian categories), just to choose three examples. The 
main point of this paper is to defend the idea that these philosophical ‘x-files’ all 
occupy the same cabinet drawer. (Incidentally, it must be noted that these kinds 
are not mutually exclusive descriptions of cases. So, for example, claims that 
someone occupies an irrational position are so likely to be used as a cudgel for 
the purpose of epistemic abuse that they might also count as irrational ends. 




Even when limited to the examination of radical cases, a full articulation of the 
concept of irrational intentionality depends on analysis of the two component 
ideas, rationality and intentionality. This is not an easy task since both concepts 
resist reduction. If there is anything fundamental to consciousness, then 
intentionality is a good candidate. Putting aside meditative states, there is little 
point in denying that rational consciousness is always consciousness of 
something. To put an analytical gloss on it, a judgment is directly about the 
conditions under which it is worthy of assent (whether it be conditions for truth 
or execution), and indirectly about its terms (conditions for satisfaction). The 
terms of a judgment can be about objects, categorizations, and ends (to choose a 
small but important sample). Yet, consciousness about something is also always 
accomplished by way of an orientation towards what one is thinking about, and 
partly projected upon what one thinks about, and through which it is conceived. 
The ‘orientation’ of a judgment is, as it were, a residue of the knowing self that 
has been left on what the judgment is about. So, for example, one might observe 
that consciousness of every object is consciousness of an object of attention. 
Similarly, every classification is conceived as a Gestalt, every end is an end 
through a conation, and every fact is a fact conceived through a position. (See 
Fig.2.) In all of these cases, insofar as we are conceiving of the judgment itself, 
the italicized orientations are generally accessible to meta-cognition, while the 
terms characterize what is thought about. At least during waking hours and lucid 
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dreams, this two-part aspect of rational consciousness is available to 

















What is to be done 
Position 
 
A preliminary characterization of a few of these ideas may be helpful. ‘Conation’ 
means something like ‘effective motivation’, or the perceptible force of the 
judgment that is antecedent to the behavior in action. In this respect, a conation 
can be distinguished from doxastic (propositional or imperative) attitudes 
because conations are not necessarily ‘about’ anything, so much as they are 
causal explanations of how (e.g.) our ends are pursued, which could be 
retroactively described as reasons for action. I take it that a ‘position’ is a complex 
orientation through which we understand our judgments, but only manifest when 
directed towards higher-order judgments, i.e., those judgments that explicitly 
contain a reference to one or more doxastic attitudes. (My position relative to the 
sun is not a manifest issue in the sentence, “The sun is too bright”, but it is 
manifest in “I feel like the sun is too bright”.) Positions may or may not be a 
direct function of the will. For example, on one extreme, some especially resilient 
positions are often diagnosed as ‘schemes’, either somatic or conceptual. These 
schemes impose certain second-order attitudes upon us by alethic or effective 
necessity, and based on our innate structural endowments (e.g., for Kant, that 
every object is an object of intuition) -- but because of their pervasiveness they 
can only discovered through painstaking research (e.g., into natural semantic 
universals). On the other extreme, positions that can be occupied on demand are 
more like epistemological ‘stances’, and harder to distinguish from taking on a 
second-order set of attitudes provisionally. In the middle are volitional 
necessities, understood as a function of things we care about, and which constitute 
our complex stories about ‘who we are’ from the internal point of view.viii 
These rows are arranged in pairs: object-attention, categorization-Gestalt, and 
so on. But these pairings are characteristic, not necessary. So, for example, it is 
entirely possible to talk about the rationality of speaking about classifications 
conceived through positions (e.g., purport), or objects through conations 
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(affordances).ix Indeed, mono-sentential paradoxes have been characterized above 
as a case of contentful flip-floppiness, i.e., failure of a claim to maintain its 
contents insofar as we are paying it the merest attention.x I only single out these 
pairings for initial discussion because, when they are misaligned, they make for 
compelling and distinctive exemplars of radical cases while also appealing to 
phenomena that are relatively familiar in the literature. 
Rationality involves a strict supporting relationship between judgments and a 
satisfactory accounting of the reason(s) for the judgment, insofar as those reasons 
are properly coordinated. (A loose relationship between judgment and reasons is 
merely reasonable, as opposed to rational. Though whether hard radical cases 
count as unreasonable or irrational is a matter of manifest interpretation – see 
below.) But then the notion of ‘reasons for judgment’ needs unpacking. The 
relationship between practical reasons and ends is a promising place to begin, 
since both reasons and ends are at least part of good answers to the question, ‘why 
did you do that?’.xi Folk psychologists think that practical reasons are pairings 
between coordinated beliefs and desires.xii The ‘end’ or ‘goal’ is the term 
embedded in the aspirational part of the reason for the judgment. On first pass, 
then, practical rationality means having a strict supporting connection between 
judgments of what is to be done and coordinated attitudes, typically beliefs and 
desires. A judgment is irrational insofar as the orientation towards the judgment 
subverts the strict connection between the judgment and its reasons (i.e., the 
corresponding set of coordinated attitudes). Ultimately, the nature of that ‘strict’ 
connection is the subject of our investigation – we phenomenologists are trying 
to see to what extent we can earn it from the tribunal of experience. For the 
intentionalist, the nature of the strict connection is supposed to be adduced by 
observing the manifest lack of fit between the contents of a practical judgment 
(e.g., command and its terms) and the corresponding account of attitudes (e.g., 
coordinated beliefs and desires). At core, the idea that a strict supporting 
connection can be subverted necessarily depends on the proposal that one’s 
orientation in a judgment is capable of making a decisive difference to the 
relationship between the judgment and its supporting attitudes. 
 
It is best to talk vaguely about reasons in terms of their representational and 
aspirational role, and not to concentrate on particular attitudes like beliefs, 
because the vocabulary of folk psychology is richer and vaguer than we 
sometimes give it credit. ‘Belief, intention, desire’ do not exhaust our lexicon of 
folk attitudes, as there is a standing reserve of antecedents to that-clauses -- e.g., 
imagining, guessing, assuming, intuiting, expecting, and accepting -- which all 
make a direct positive contribution to parts of the process of knowledge 
production.xiii Moreover, there is no antecedent reason to think non-standard 
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attitudes of this kind will simply reduce to the language of belief and desire. For 
one example of a clumsy attempt at reduction, consider expectations. An 
expectation is sometimes seen as a kind of belief, and belief essentially directed 
at truth. Yet they do not share the same meaning, since ‘Your belief is true’ makes 
perfect sense, while ‘Your expectation is true’ sounds like it was written by an 
author with a tin ear. Nevertheless, in the context of practical reason, expectations 
may play a belief-like role when answering “why did you do that?”, in that the 
expectation may be directed towards facts about opportunities for action. 
Considerations of this sort are behind the decision to discuss doxastic attitudes 
that are ostensibly fact-directed (such as intuition, expectation, and belief) in 
terms of ‘holdings’, as in, ‘holding that p’. Similar substitutions prompt the use 
of the conventional term, ‘valuing’, to describe standards of evaluation framed as 
an (anti-) preference – e.g., dreaming, wishing, hoping, needing, wanting, and 
demanding, and so on. I do not suggest these general terms must be useful on 
further analysis, but only that they seem appropriate to assume when doing 
philosophy after Hume. 
Be that as it may, when I consult the tribunal of experience, I find that there 
are no guarantees that the difference between what is ‘valued’ and what is ‘held’ 
always merits a crisp demarcation. For while the contrast between these two sorts 
is pretty obvious when it comes to tokens of belief-desire pairs (e.g., during 
creative high-level planning, the contrast is rather stark), it is more of an ordeal 
to motivate these role assignments when talking about small-scale actions. So, 
e.g., it isn’t always obvious that the type of attitude, ‘accept’, covers tokens that 
have an aspirational role in inference, and that tokens of ‘recognize’ always play 
a representational role. If I judge that following the rules of baseball is ‘the thing 
to be done’ while I am playing baseball, the (ostensibly) aspirational reason I 
provide -- ‘I accept the rules of baseball’ – does not seem intuitively like it differs 
from the (ostensibly) representational reason, ‘I recognize the rules of baseball’. 
To be sure, there is presumably a truth-conditional difference to the assertions, 
but it is not clear that the distinction always conforms to their aspirational and 
representational roles. So, if during the process of rational deliberation on 
practical judgments we decide that we cannot infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ come 
what may, as an institutional certification of proper thought about oughts, then 
either the aspirational role assignment to attitudes will be done ad hoc, or the 
practical judgment will be reinterpreted as a theoretical one. Presumably, an ad 
hoc connection between judgment and supporting attitudes would fall short of 
being a strict connection – at best, it seems better to say it’s a loose connection 
(i.e., merely reasonable, not rational). Meanwhile, in other contexts, the 
difference between ‘aspirational’ and ‘representational’ attitudes is quite 
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discernable and experientially motivated, where ‘accept’ seems less like 
acknowledgment and more like giving a mental ‘thumbs up’.  
It would be nice to be able to explain that contrast between high- and low-
contrast contexts, if at all possible. One way of understanding the difference is 
by attributing a difference of position. When I am in an activated physiological 
state, it may be especially obvious to me that my attitudes towards practical 
judgment can be delineated according to their aspirational and representational 
roles. When you want things passionately, it is easier to say: ‘Ah, I desire this, 
and I believe I do not have it, and here is my plan to bridge the gap.’ Yet this 
obviousness is diminished and confounded in a passive or chronically depressed 
position, as far as the small-scale nuanced attitudes are concerned. When I am in 
a listless or depressed position, most of the positive parts of my experience can 
be found in nuanced or ambiguous states of expectation and acceptance – 
typically, experiences with the sublime. (My own experience presented itself as 
if it were fear of effecting desire, or the experience of desire as if it were terror, 
and even sometimes as an addiction to belief; and that when rousing action did 
come, it came as a surprise.) So, it seems that the position one occupies can make 
a difference to the rational status of nuanced attitudes to judgment, however we 
want to characterize that difference. 
Does this necessarily seem like a case of irrational intentionality at all, i.e., 
where a strict connection is subverted? For the nuanced practical attitudes that I 
have regarding the rules of baseball are at least a reasonable basis for the 
corresponding judgment to obey the rules, even if they fall short of providing 
strict support. I do not mean anything special by the idea of ‘subversion’, and use 
the term with its expected effects in mind. These are twofold. 1. ‘Subversion’ of 
rationality need not imply that the person is bereft of practical reason. It is still 
possible to be in a state of irrational intentionality while still being reasonable, 
just in case the position only subverts the strict connection while preserving a 
loose one. (If all I have going for me are the nuanced attitudes, I will likely play 
a lacklustre game of baseball. But at least I am playing in a way that responds to 
appropriate reasons.) 2. Even so, if your position subverts a strict connection 
between attitudes and judgment, there are no guarantees that even the loose 
connection will hold, all other things equal. For a position to ‘subvert’ a 
connection between a judgment and its attitudes is just to make it weaker than 
some other kind of supporting relation. 
Be that as it may, clinical cases are not necessarily going to help us to think 
about substantial reason, since substantial accounts of rationality are interested in 
finding fault where it is due, and clinical cases are, presumably, faultless. For 
while occupying the passive position decisively weakens the judgment-attitudes 
relation, clinical depression is not a second-order choice. Assuming that clinical 
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depression and other disorders of praxis are properly characterized as weakness 
of will, they have to be acknowledged as especially severe, or global, weaknesses 
of will. In that respect, such cases are unlike the sort of core cases of weakness 
of the rational will (akrasia) that are typical to the literature in practical 
rationality, i.e., local cases of free, sane, intentional action.xiv For example, an 
otherwise healthy person’s addiction to cigarettes gives them strong desire to 
smoke, and so gives them a strong supporting attitude towards smoking which 
subverts their other desire, which is to quit smoking. As a result, the smoker who 
gives in to the urge is a case of irrational intentionality. Yet that characterization 
does not hold quite as obviously for the case of the clinical depressive, because 
the lapsed quitter at least has some hope available to think they could have done 
or believed otherwise. So, the hope of an ability to judge otherwise is a salient 
feature of many cases where a strict supporting connection has been subverted, 
and where we do not feel the need to abstain from finding fault. For diagnostic 
purposes, we might even say that the hope of an ability to do otherwise is a 
necessary condition for tractable cases of subversion (compared with incorrigible 
cases, e.g., delusional or fantastic reasoning). Yet, since this hope does not need 
to be contingent on the agent’s failed deployment of anything like a ‘cost-benefit’ 
analysis in the moment, it is visible under the phenomenological blindfold. So, it 
is a radical case. 
Here is another persuasive instance of a tractable case of irrational 
intentionality: taking up a position of constitutive ignorance, i.e., a position which 
furnishes epistemically defective states (false beliefs, inappropriate designs, and 
the like) as a matter of necessity, but where the force of necessity can be pretty 
well understood without ever assuming that they are in possession of 
sophisticated instrumental reasons for doubt.xv The most interesting examples of 
constitutive ignorance are cases of ignorance brought on by perverse volitional 
necessities. For example, hard-core members of the Flat-Earth Society define the 
conditions of group membership in terms of a false belief – that is to say, a 
straight-forward delusion about the form of the Earth -- in such a way that, insofar 
as they are rational and sincere believers, any attempt to challenge the legitimacy 
of the group will have all the effects of an existential challenge to it. And if 
members are members of it as a matter of volitional necessity, then it may have 
all the force of a challenge to them as individual persons. This precludes them 
from objective knowledge of Terran topography. And yet we are not precluded 
from finding fault, since they were the ones who chose to identify with false 
things at some point in their lives. 
But, notice, that cases of constitutive ignorance are more than just cases of 
willful ignorance.xvi When it comes to cases of constitutive ignorance, the very 
conditions for a person’s narrative identity require them to ignore contrary 
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evidence owing to what they care about, and to do so indefinitely. These false 
narratives are important to them as distinctive persons because they provide 
meaningful content to one’s sense of integrity, insofar as they are conceived of 
as being bearers of meaning and value. Someone does not come to care about 
something just because they decided to, and they do not extricate themselves 
from what they care about just because they decide not to. In both of these senses, 
we say that volitional necessities are genuine cases of ‘necessity’. By contrast, 
merely willful ignorance is reversible on demand, perhaps just as well described 
as taking on a new position as in adopting new second-order aspirations in order 
to see what happens to your first-order conative states. At any rate, the important 
point is that true believers in the Flat Earth Society are ignorant because their 
position makes delusion necessary, with respect to claims about the roundness of 
the Earth. Their belief is irrational because of how they are oriented towards the 
content of their belief, and only so because of the position they have put 
themselves in. 
 
Discussion of positions makes one think immediately of adopting epistemically 
peculiar stances. Consider, for example, radical embodied in weird art. 
Specifically, let’s consider Salvador Dalí’s remarks on surrealism, taken from his 
essay ‘Conquest of the Irrational’. In that polemic, he encourages us to see things 
through the position of someone in an artificially induced state of delirium or 
paranoia. In his wonderful paintings, “images of concrete irrationality are thus 
authentically unknown images", with familiar melting clocks, exotic shapes, and 
so on. The main point of the “paranoid-critical” method is “the systematic-
interpretative organization of surrealist experimental sensational material” that is 
“scattered and narcissistic". Dalí tells us that the surrealists artificially place 
themselves into a paranoid and delirious position, for the purposes of 
intentionally distorting what they are thinking about. As a result, the surrealist 
notices during the course of a day a variety of perverse happenings, "revealing a 
minimum of irrational intentionality, or, just the opposite, a minimum of suspect 
phenomenal nullity". By the former, I take him to mean irrational objects and 
events, as far as they relate to judgments about what is properly perceived.xvii (By 
the latter, I suppose he means to refer to the perceptible residue left over by 
radical doubt, though he apparently thinks that the ‘minimum of suspect 
phenomenological nullities’ are more like mundane embodied happenings than 
the higher operations of the Cogito.) 
We should take Dalí at his word when he says that the surrealist method 
produces awareness of irrational intentionality, but it is also worth trying to figure 
out what is so irrational about what he is thinking about. The surrealist was not 
constitutively ignorant. Dalí thought the surrealist project was telling us 
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something important about reason and rationality, insofar as it relates to rational 
intuition. A central aim of the method, as I understand it, was to force the reader 
to acknowledge that the objective irrationality of a thought does not necessarily 
make the thought impossible for a rational person to think. So, it was not 
irrational because it produced irrational beliefs -- the surrealist was not a 
Lovecraftian villain who wished to push us into a permanent state of psychosis. 
The surrealist only wished us to understand that it is possible to pay attention to 
things in an irrational way -- i.e., to observe that we are able to orient ourselves 
towards objects and events in a way that makes them seem unnecessarily alien. 
And, far from being a volitional necessity, the surrealist’s method is adopted at 
will. For that reason, it is hard to consider it an irrational position. I would instead 
like to call these cases of ‘irrational attention’, and return to them later in the 
paper for a diagnosis of what makes them distinctive. 
 
Positions are orientations toward second-order judgments: constitutive ignorance 
is an irrational position, while the surrealist method is a rational position towards 
irrational events and objects. One naturally begins to wonder about expanding 
the list to further higher-order states, i.e., third- and fourth- order cases of 
irrational intentionality.xviii For example, the documentarian Adam Curtis coined 
the term ‘hypernormalization’ to describe an experience where a person takes on 
(or is forced to take on) a position that seems antecedently surreal or disorienting, 
and in doing so, become open to facts that threaten their constitutive ignorance. 
In the political sphere, hypernormalization is a complex, fourth-order collective 
intentional state, as it implies taking on a totally different position towards what 
powerful people want us to want, resulting in new (fleeting) perception of facts, 
much like the first experiences of the philosopher when they exit Plato’s Cave. 
To be sure, such cases of ‘rupture’ are of enormous interest.xix Yet the higher up 
the chain of higher-order attitudes we climb, the more that it seems like we are at 
risk of introducing explicit means-ends inferences into our context of 




I have characterized radical cases of irrational intentionality as cases where the 
strict supporting relationship between attitudes and judgment has been subverted, 
owing to manifest defects in the ways that the thinker is oriented towards the 
contents of judgment. Our main focus has been on subversive orientations in 
general, and on tractable examples in particular (i.e., cases where there is a hope 
of being able to judge otherwise). Three subversive orientations were discussed 
– conations that subvert ends (akrasia), positions that subvert objects of attention 
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(paranoid-critical method), and positions that subvert knowledge (constitutive 
ignorance). Yet one issue has been neglected, namely, the irrationality of 
categorizations. 
It is sometimes admitted that concepts can themselves be irrational. For 
example, the original legal category of ‘genocide’ contains technical limitations 
that make it difficult to use in such a way as would produce reliable inferential 
consequences, since the legal category does not include a great many instances 
of invidious mass killing (e.g., gendercide, urbanicide) on seemingly ad hoc 
grounds, since the technical concept – hereafter, ‘categorization’ -- only includes 
a narrowly circumscribed number of protected classes (e.g., religion, nationality, 
ethnicity, race). In this example, the legal category of ‘genocide’ can be 
anticipated to fail at serving the ends for which it was designed – namely, the 
intended destruction of whole peoples.xx Hence, this defect in the concept reflects 
a powerful, and interesting, instrumental explanation of the irrationality of 
concepts themselves -- namely, that they might sometimes be diagnosed as 
failures owing to their inappropriate inferential consequences, and that that fact 
alone must reflect a failure of means-ends reasoning. For vulgar pragmatism held 
that the whole question of successful inference depends on utility.xxi And if they 
are right, then the instrumental account has won the day -- for they will then have 
shown that all concepts are instrumental, irrespective of their theoretical or 
practical context. Yet, by way of contrast, I think it is just as plausible that we 
could call some concept ‘defective’ owing to something about the ways we are 
oriented towards its conditions of application. The categorization fails to have the 
kind of internal unity that plausibly maps onto a reliable location in conceptual 
space, and there is no need to describe this in terms of its instrumental role. It is 
phenomenologically unacceptable. 
To flesh out the idea that a category can be antecedently unacceptable, we 
should consider a relatively clear case: disjunctive categories. Surrealist author 
Jorge Luis Borges is the namesake of those categorizations we call ‘Borgesian 
categories’. In one story, Borges’s fictitious narrator reported on a peculiar 
taxonomy of animals, which read as follows: “Those that belong to the emperor, 
embalmed ones, those that are trained, suckling pigs, mermaids (or Sirens), 
fabulous ones, stray dogs, those that are included in this classification, those that 
tremble as if they were mad, innumerable ones, those drawn with a very fine 
camel hair brush, et cetera, those that have just broken the flower vase, and those 
that, at a distance, resemble flies”. There are plenty of things wrong with the 
definition (i.e., it is circular and uninformative), but for my purposes the central 
characteristic is that its intension (definition) is disjunctive.xxii Intuitively, the 
semantic-lexical parts of the intension do not hang together in a coherent pattern, 
and are only unified by the implicit license to shift focus whenever one makes a 
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strategic use of ‘or’. On first glance, it seems reasonable to suspect that Borgesian 
categories are not going to be generally helpful to inquiry, based on antecedent 
formulation of the conditions of application alone. 
Yet, admittedly, this is too quick. Recall, one analytic philosopher famously 
asked us to consider the strange properties of the color predicate, ‘grue’, where: 
“’grue’ denotes green before time (t), and denotes blue at (t+1)”. This, too, is a 
disjunctive definition, albeit one conveniently separated into time-slices. 
Phenomenologically, ‘grue’ seems like irrational categorization because there is 
just something defective about the ways that we are oriented towards the 
denotation of the term. But the defects might be merely apparent. So, consider 
the case of ‘planet*’, which has the following salient implication: “The extension 
of ’planet (simpliciter)’ includes Pluto at time before 2006, and does not include 
it after 2006”. Here, ‘planet*’ is formally identical to ‘grue’ in being a Borgesian 
category. Yet (as a matter of fact) ‘planet*’ describes the actual linguistic 
conventions of the International Astronomical Union. Where ‘grue’ seemed like 
an irrational categorization, there is no mystery whatsoever to ‘planet*’: the 
scientists decided that certain kinds of explanatory inference were worth caring 
about, which prompted a shift in extension. Given the rich contextual and 
instrumental environment, a case of irrational intentionality turned out to be 
wholly reasonable, and perhaps even rational. Diagnosis: the phenomenological 
blindfold caused us to misdiagnose a perfectly reasonable description of the facts 
as a case of irrational intentionality. If that’s true, then the intentionalist argument 
has apparently failed. 
But this instrumentalist argument misses an important distinction. Suppose 
we agree that some disjunctive categories are malevolent (e.g., grue), while some 
are benign (e.g., planet*). Then we have to motivate the difference without 
talking about its broader role in means-ends reasoning. On first pass, of course, 
we could make a distinction in terms of their explanatory role. Planet* has a 
helpful explanatory role, not just in making sense of the universe, but also in 
making sense of our coordinated higher-order attitudes towards that universe, and 
our shifting sense of which inferences are worth caring about when we use the 
word “planet”. But one must not suppose that science is the sole standard for 
intelligibility; if one does, then they are left to wonder what to do with cases that 
are intelligible to reasonable people without being especially helpful to scientific 
explanation. The phenomenological difference lies in the peculiar sense we have, 
in considering the difference between grue and planet*, that planet* at least 
preserves a pattern. Consider Heraclitus’s aphorism, the proposal that we 
supposedly can never step in the same river twice, it being always a bit different 
with the passage of time. On some reflection, it should be clear that Heraclitean 
river(s) are a function of a disjunctive categorization practice: what we call ‘river’ 
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in ordinary language is in fact a set of rivers, indexed to particular moments, and 
unified only as a Borgesian category. It is plain enough (to me) that the Borgesian 
river-manifold is not fit for ordinary belief (except, perhaps, in the philosophy 
seminar). It is a case of irrational intentionality, because the categorization is 
plainly out of joint with the apprehended Gestalt. Still, one hopefully understands 
the point of talking about the Heraclitean rivers -- it is not absurd or nonsensical 
to talk about or think about for its own sake, owing to its failure to fit an innate, 
absolute scheme in cognition. Indeed, the puzzle of the Heraclitean river has 
illuminated and motivated some genuinely interesting puzzles in language and 
mind. So, it is a benign categorization, because we know that we can depend on 
the demonstrative unity, pattern, or Gestalt of the denoted river-manifold to 
persist independently of how we categorize it. It is only irrational when forced to 
play a role in belief. So, the phenomenologist can make sense of the idea of a 
‘pattern’ in planet*, and captures an important nuance that instrumentalism does 
not need to care about. 
To be sure, instrumental or means-ends reasoning is probably indispensable 
when justifying our ways of thinking about physical structures or ‘real patterns’, 
of the sort that would distinguish between the epistemic status of centers of 
gravity and the smallest geographic circle which contains all of Daniel Dennett’s 
lost socks. Astrophysics counts the inclusion of the former as a net gain, while no 
science makes much productive use of the latter. All the same, real patterns are 
not patterns simpliciter, and patterns simpliciter are just ways of talking about 
one of the most intimate parts of our experience without ontological 
commitments. So, e.g. we have to have hope in our ability to talk about patterns 
in spite of the noise (attributed structure across contexts), as opposed to patterns 
in the noise (attributed structure in context).xxiii So, for example, a happy face 
momentarily glimpsed in TV static is a pattern, as it is one of those odd ‘minimum 
suspect phenomenological nullities’ that Dalí likely had in mind. Yet it differs in 
its qualities from other kinds of patterns which are identified through means-ends 
reasoning related to explanation and prediction: i.e., a repeatable illusion found 
in a stereogram, or repeated observations of celestial objects and events that 
behave on schedule (and mathematical abstracta concocted on that basis), all 
have a Gestalt sensibility. Yet none are like the malevolent grue, since it lacks a 
pattern. And that reason is sufficient to regard it as a case of irrational 
categorization. A separate question is whether the legal definition of genocide 
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I suggested at the outset that an account of irrational intentionality might be useful 
to the substantial theorist, who believes in ‘ends-in-themselves’. I have not tried 
to elaborate on this narrow slice of the idea of irrational ends, preferring first to 
make sense of the broader category of irrational intentionality. My hope is we 
could figure out how the idea supports or subverts theories in politics, law, or 
justice only afterwards. Even here, the findings are only partial. After all, a theory 
of irrational intentionality only provides us with a set of tools that provide a 
negative result, i.e., which allow us falsify assertions about the status of ends-in-
themselves. So, for instance, we have not tried to weigh in with an account of 
intrinsic value that decisively settles the status of the rational good will 
(eleutheronomy) as opposed to happiness (eudaimonia). We have only provided 
a test of what ends-in-themselves cannot be -- namely, those cases where a 
practical judgment is subverted by the orientation that one takes towards it. For 
example, a moral theory that regarded ends-in-themselves through an orientation 
that resulted in carelessness, meaninglessness, corruption, and akrasia, is a theory 
that would be guilty of gross confusion – and they would be confused, not merely 
because of means-ends reasons, but also because they fail a test of intrinsic 
validity. 
But we must be careful not to infer the wrong consequences from this idea. 
It is entirely possible that someone will have read all this and conclude that they 
have a new set of rhetorical tools that directly help to assign blame to parties to a 
deep moral disagreement -- that irrational intentionality is a mark of viciousness, 
delusion, and so on. But no, that is not the point. For, in the first instance, 
irrational intentionality is a diagnostic tool in philosophy of mind and a theory of 
knowledge. When we talk about tractable cases, our only hope is to identify a 
consideration that, in some broad sense, makes a decisive difference to the ways 
we might find fault with how people reason, insofar as we have understood their 
reasoning and situation. It is not necessarily to suggest that cases of irrationality 
are worthy of blame. 
Perhaps the role that a theory of irrational intentionality has in moral inquiry 
might be better conceived as a way of understanding the role of negative 
intuitions in reasoning, especially practical reasoning. Huckleberry Finn was 
faced with one such negative intuition.xxiv Raised in the racist South, Finn had 
bigoted instrumental opinions about the status of Black people in his society. Yet 
he also had a negative intuition towards racism when he was forced to reconcile 
the dogma with the existence of his friend, Jim. Ultimately, Finn found himself 
unable to act on his considered beliefs, and in that sense was akratic. That is also 
a case of irrational intentionality, insofar as his conations subverted his judgment 
that Jim was to be turned in, by virtue of what the judgment was about (Jim). Yet 
that subversion of judgment was praiseworthy, not blameworthy – Finn’s 
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conscience was reasons-responsive. There is a fault to be found, perhaps even a 
moral fault, but the fault was with some of the global aspects of his orientation to 
judgment, not a fault with the decision itself. 
The upside to the decision to focus on tractable cases is that they are directed 
towards our discursive powers, i.e., our powers to set the terms of conversational 
engagement in a way that makes cooperation possible. For without that 
assumption -- i.e., the assumption that critical discursive engagement really is a 
going concern – we are helpless but to deploy absolutist criteria for moral 
cooperation, developed in a first-personal fashion from transcendental truths, and 
deployed as scorekeepers in discussion of normative responsibility as if it were a 
zero-sum game. These are valid possibilities, perhaps, and might be rooted in the 
synthetic apriori propositions that can withstand the scrutiny of a mature 
cognitive science. But they are not happy places to begin investigation into a 
peculiar and difficult subject of how to make sense of ends-in-themselves. 
I conclude with a suggestion. It seems to me that the presumption of good 
faith is best motivated by other worries I have about our understanding of ends-
in-themselves. For whatever intrinsic values might be, they must be rooted in our 
experiential condition (i.e., not especially spooky) and potentially held in 
common (i.e., open to rational debate on the basis of shared evidence). 
Phenomenology helps us with both these requirements. It proposes that our 
attention is about things, and hence things in common -- thus, we are able to share 
the very same values or ends. But it strains plausibility to think we all experience 
things in the same sense -- hence, our values are a function of the ways we are 
oriented to them. If this seems like a productive aim for inquiry into the study of 
justice, morals, and the social sciences, then we cannot presuppose that intrinsic 
goods correspond to fixed, prior, categories that are a function of our first-person 
capacities, necessarily resulting in unique right answers. Nor are such first-
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